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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of living in vulnerable zone in term of nitrates
on property prices using a change in the geographical delimitation of the zone in
France. Using an identification strategy based on a spatial difference-in-differences
specification, we show that the 2012 revision policy decreases significantly property
prices not only in areas that becomes vulnerable at the time of the policy but also in
areas that were already considered as vulnerable before the policy change.
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Introduction
In Europe, Council Directive 91/676/EEC has been implemented to protect waters against
pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources through a number of measures incum-
bent on Member States. These measures concern monitoring surface waters and groundwa-
ter, designating vulnerable zones, introducing codes of good agricultural practice, adopting
action programs, and evaluating the actions implemented. In this project, we are concerned
with vulnerable zones which are all known areas of land which drain into surface waters
and groundwater which are affected by pollution or at risk of being so. In fact, nitrates in
drinking water, which may come from nitrogen fertilizers applied to crops, are a potential
health risk (Crutchfield et al., 1997). Vulnerable zones have been revised in 2012 in France
due to pollution concentration from surface waters and groundwater observed in 2010-2011.
Today, nearby 55 % of France is classified as vulnerable zones, which corresponds to regions
where agricultural land is the most important. This project aims to examine the impact of
a potential change in the environment linked with the change of vulnerable zones in 2012
on property prices. In fact, water quality can have a significant effect on property values
(Leggett and Bockstael, 2000).
The literature underlines the need to develop novel methods to improve our ability to
estimate the marginal willingness to pay for environmental improvements (Bento, 2013),
(Lavaine, 2014). A wide range of studies on this topic use quasi-experimental technique.
Davis (2004) measures the effect of health risk on housing values by exploiting a severe
increase in pediatric leukemia in an isolated county in Nevada as a natural experiment.
In addition, Currie et al. (2015) measure recently the housing market and health impacts
of 1,600 openings and closings of industrial plants that emit toxic pollutants. Chay and
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Greenstone (2005) exploit the quasi-random assignment of air pollution changes across
counties induced by federally mandated air pollution regulations to identify the impact of
particulate matter on property values. Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) use the Superfund
cleanups to analyze its local welfare impacts. In the same vein, to mitigate selection and
endogeneity problems and to infer the impact of a new directive on property prices, we
use the 2012 boundary revision as a quasi-experimental approach. While this is not the
first difference in difference study to use the effect of an environmental policy on hedonic
prices as a natural experiment, this study aims to analyze the consequences of a shift in
risk perception on housing markets not only in areas directly concerned by a policy change,
but also in neighborhood areas indirectly concerned by this policy change. It aims to shed
light on people’s willingness to pay for perceived differences in nitrates risk. The analysis
of this paper focuses on municipalities in the Centre and Poitou Charentes region, where
residents recently were considered to be living in a sensitive geographical area in terms of
nitrates, though this is not the only place in France. The geographic region for the control
group is then represented by all towns not classified as vulnerable zones. House prices
in new sensitive areas are compared before and after the 2012 designation of vulnerable
zones with the nearby municipalities. The conditions of supply and demand for housing
are relatively similar in both groups, so that we can expect a similar set of implicit prices
in vulnerable zones and in its surroundings.
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Data and empirical strategy
Data sources
Property prices are drawn from a unique and detailed dataset -PERVAL- compiled by
the Chambre of Notaires (who records property transactions) from 2011 to 2014. Table
1 presents a summary statistics about property transaction over 4 years in the Centre
and Poitou Charentes Region. We have precisely obtained information about property
transactions for 4 departments 1 namely Vienne (86) and Charente Maritime (17) for the
Poitou Charente region; Loiret (45) and Indre et Loire (37) for the Centre region. We have
classified municipalities with respect to the date they have been considered as vulnerable.
Out of 676 municipalities, 135 have never been classified as nitrates sensitive, 456 have been
classified as nitrates sensitive before 2012 and 85 have been classified as nitrates sensitive
in 2012. Figure 1 provides a geographical representation of this delimitation. The key
variables of the PERVAL dataset are the property prices, the number of floors, the number
of rooms, the type of flat or house, the property surface, the presence of a terrace, an attic,
a parking space, a balcony, a pool or a terrace and a variable which indicates if the property
is less than 5 years old. Panel A of table 1 shows the average price by property and year.
We observe that property prices are higher before the 2012 boundary than after 2012 for
all municipalities of the study, hinting at potential effects from the regulation. Also shown
is the number of transactions per municipalities by year. One concern with our analysis is
that a change of a sensitive area can affect the number of property transactions, potentially
leading to sample selection bias. As shown in Table 1, the number of transactions is higher
1 Department is a French geographical level below the regional level.
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across the nitrates areas than in non-nitrates areas. Further, when we run regressions
using the number of transactions as the dependent variable, we do not find a statistically
significant relationship between the number of transactions and the geographical boundary,
suggesting a change in the number of transactions, if it arises, is unlikely to bias our
estimates.
Empirical Methodology
Our goal is to assess the impact of vulnerable zone boundary on property prices. We esti-
mate difference in difference models to exploit the change in the boundary in 2012. Housing
prices are compared before and after the geographical boundary change with nearby munic-
ipalities acting as a control group. We implement this by estimating the following equation:
Yimy = βnitratesim ∗ policyy + δXimy + σy + αm + imy (1)
where Y is the log of property prices of the transaction i in municipality m at year y 2.
Turning to the independent variables, ’policy’ is an indicator variable for the year of the new
boundary of vulnerable area that corresponds to 2012, and ’nitrate’ is an indicator variable
for whether the municipality is classified as vulnerable. β is the difference-in-difference
parameter. Ximy is a vector of properties controls that includes year of construction, the
surface of the property, the surface of the parking, the surface of the main room, the num-
ber of rooms, the presence of an attic and the presence of a balcony. It also differentiates
specific attributes for house and flat such as the type of house and the presence of a pool
2The unit of observation is the transaction-year. We have 14348, 13376, 16159 and 13624 transactions
in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively.
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and a terrace or the type of flat and the number of level. We control for temporal patterns
by including year dummies in σy. Because many properties were sold repeatedly during the
sample period it is possible to control for unobserved municipalities-characteristics. Thus,
we include municipalities fixed effects (αm) to control for time-invariant characteristics of
the municipality. imy represents the error term, which consists of an idiosynchratic com-
ponent and a term clustered on the municipality and year 3. Kuminoff et al. (2010) suggest
that large gains in accuracy can be realized by moving from the standard linear specifica-
tions for the price function to a more flexible framework that would use a combination of
spatial fixed effects, quasi-experimental identifications, and temporal controls for housing
market adjustment.
As with any difference in difference design, the key underlying assumption for identi-
fication is that the control group serves as a valid counterfactual for the treatment group
with parallel trends. Although we cannot explicitly verify this assumption, we feel this
threat is limited in this setting for several reasons. First, figure 2 shows a similar evolution
of prices in both group before the 2012 revision of boundary areas. Furthermore, we vary
the definition of treatment to test the robustness of our results in the next section. Be-
cause the boundary of a sensitive zone could be anticipated, we also could expect sorting of
households according to preferences prior to the boundary. Using a really rich and exhaus-
tive dataset for property transactions, we are able to distinguish municipalities that were
already considered as vulnerable in 2012 to municipalities that will become vulnerable in
2012. The issue of sorting, following the 2012 policy, is limited in municipalities considered
3We cluster on the municipality because this is the unit of boundary for vulnerable zones, and on the year
since this is the unit of measurement for the price. This yields a total of 2704 clusters (676 municipalities*4
years). By clustering on the municipality we are also accounting for potential serial correlation within a
municipality.
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vulnerable before 2012 as households may have already sort themselves at the time of the
old geographical boundary.
Results
Figure 2 provides a yearly graph of adjusted prices levels from 2011 to 2014 for the treat-
ment and control groups, with prices levels adjusted by δXimy, σy and αm. Prior to the
2012 regulation, prices levels are higher in municipalities with classification. Immediately
after the regulation, prices levels in vulnerable areas decrease whereas prices levels in non-
vulnerable areas increase. After the 2012 revision, prices level in municipalities that are not
classified as nitrates sensitive exceed those of nitrates sensitive areas. This visual display
clearly demonstrates a strong, temporal effect of the 2012 regulation on prices levels. The
following tables provide regression estimates of equation (1), which are largely analogous
to this figure. First, table 2 presents the effect of the regulation on the overall property
market. Fixed effects are included in all of the columns. While the first block of table 2
looks at the entire dataset, the last two blocks restrict the sample with respect to the treat-
ment group. In fact, each block corresponds to a different treatment. Hence, We test for
the heterogeneity of the treatment results by interacting the ’policy’ variable with different
definition of treatment. In fact, it is interesting to wonder what could be the impact of
the 2012 revision on municipalities that were already considered as vulnerable. To do so,
we choose to vary the treatment group (’nitrates’) to distinguish the impact of the 2012
revision on municipalities that were already classified as vulnerable in 2012 and municipal-
ities that will only become vulnerable in 2012. Column 1 uses a difference-in-differences
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model without property characteristics. Column 2 takes full advantage of control variables.
Property characteristics are added to control for any differences in the evolution of property
characteristics between the treatment and control group. The estimates are negative but
not significant in the three different treatment as shown in every columns of table 2. This
absence of significant results for the overall sample leads us to wonder about the existence
of potential heterogeneity among houses and flats in this market.
Thus, the following tables, table 3, table 4 and table 5 divide the dataset between flats
and houses due to potential differences in the evolution of their markets and prices. The
first two columns of each table present the results for flat whereas the last two columns
of each table focus on house results. Treatments in table 2 are the same ones as used in
tables 3, 4 and 5. While the treatment group in table 3 corresponds to municipalities that
were considered as vulnerable before 2012 or in 2012, the control group corresponds to
municipalities that are not vulnerable. The difference-in-differences estimator from table
3 is negative and significant for both house and flat. Adding control variables in column
2 and 4, decrease the size of the coefficient. Results show property prices decrease by 4%
for house and 5% for flat after the 2012 revision in municipalities that were considered
as vulnerable before 2012 or in 2012. We repeat the same exercise in table 4 restricting
the treatment group to municipalities that are only considered as vulnerable in 2012. The
difference-in-differences estimator from table 4 is negative and significant for flat in both
specifications. The coefficient, representing the impact of the revision on house prices lo-
cated in a vulnerable zone since 2012, is not significant when adding control variables in
column 4. Results show property prices decrease nearby 6% for flat after the 2012 revision
in municipalities that were considered as vulnerable in 2012. We finally repeat once again
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the exercise restricting now the treatment group in table 5 to municipalities that were con-
sidered as vulnerable before 2012 only. The difference-in-differences estimator from table 5
is negative and significant for house in both specifications. However, the coefficient repre-
senting the impact of the revision on flat prices, located in a vulnerable zone before 2012,
is not significant without considering control variables in column 1. Results show property
prices decrease nearby 4% for house and flat after the 2012 revision in municipalities that
were considered as vulnerable before 2012. First, using alternatively the same definition of
treatment, it is interesting to note the difference of results between table 2 and table 3, 4
and 5. Feitelson et al. (1996) noted that in theory, hedonic price studies do not require the
segmentation of housing markets if all attributes are adequately taken into account. How-
ever, in practice, several types of market segmentation are likely to exist in most markets.
This is because housing markets are not uniform (Adair et al., 1994),(Fletcher et al., 2000).
Hence, literature highlights it is unrealistic to treat the housing market in any geographical
location as a single entity. Unfortunately, the definition, composition, and structure of sub-
markets have not been given much attention in hedonic price literature, although this is an
important empirical issue (Fletcher et al., 2000). Thus, the market segmentation has been
done in this study dividing the market with respect to house and flat. The lack of significant
results in table 2 compared to the following tables is in line with this literature highlighting
the importance of market segmentation in empirical work. In the same vein, the literature
highlights that examining the full housing value distribution can have important policy
implications for the results of a hedonic analysis (Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins, 2013).
Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013)’s valuation of the Superfund cleanup shows that
a focus on the median housing value would have understated the larger effects at the lower
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tails of the housing value distribution. In this paper, the distinction between house and flat
acts as a proxy of the property value distribution. In general, results highlight a decrease in
property prices in municipalities classified as vulnerable (the treatment group) compared to
municipalities classified as not vulnerable (the control group). Even if we consider people
are informed about the change of vulnerable zone boundary, the demand for property may
not decrease in municipalities that were already considered as sensitive in term of nitrates
due to an absence of newer risk. Unless it is assumed that owners of properties, located in
municipalities classified as sensitive before 2012, are informed about a larger nitrate risk
in 2012, then the perception of a risk derived the hedonic pricing analysis does not explain
a decrease in property prices in municipalities that were already at risk. The perception
of the increase in health risks seem to be stronger than the real increase in health risks in
municipalities that were at risk before 2012. The 2012 boundary revision seems to act as
a reminder about the potential nitrate danger faced by municipalities.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to examine the population perception surrounding nitrates risk.
To account for the endogeneity of nitrate exposure, we exploit the change in boundary
areas in term of nitrates that occurred in 2012 in France. To do so, the empirical model
compares property prices in municipalities considered as vulnerable (the treatment group)
to municipalities considered as not vulnerable (the control group). Results are not signif-
icant for the overall market and highlight the importance of considering different market
segment such as house and flat. In line with literature, results highlight that examining
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the full property distribution leads to an absence of significativity. Considering house and
flat as a sub-market, results show a significant and negative impact of the 2012 bound-
ary definition on property values. Regression coefficients underlines that property prices
decrease for house and flat after the new geographical boundary of 2012 in municipali-
ties classified as vulnerable compared to counterparts. These results provide an answer
of the impact of geographical boundary due to environmental risks on property prices.
Implementing boundaries could increase property prices via additional measures. In fact,
setting up additional measures of risk reduction in these geographical boundaries by the
state could reduce households’ exposure and so increase the price of their dwellings. Thus,
the net impact of risk prevention boundaries on housing prices could theoretically be an
increase or a decrease of prices in the vicinity of the hazardous plants. Nevertheless, these
new boundaries, above all, can reveal risk, and results from this paper suggest that the net
impact on housing prices would be negative.
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Figure 1: Geographical boundary of nitrates sensitive areas.
Note: This figure corresponds to the geographical boundary of nitrates sensitive areas. Property trans-
actions are plotted thanks to their GPS coordinates. It corresponds to 4 regions: Loiret, Indre et Loire,
Vienne and Charentes Maritime. White corresponds to a property which is not in a vulnerable zone. Grey
and black correspond to a property which belongs to a vulnerable zone. The different colors mean they
were considered as vulnerable at a different period (Grey before 2012 and Black in 2012).
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Figure 2: Adjusted yearly price level by nitrate sensitive municipalities
Note: Prices levels are adjusted by property characteristics, year dummy variables and municipalities
characteristics (FE). The solid vertical lines indicate the date of the regulation. ’Vulnerable municipalities’
(dashed line) are municipalities classified as nitrates sensitive in 2012 or before 2012, and ’Non vulnerable
municipalities’ (darker line) are municipalities without any classification.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Mean(SE)
Variables All time period Before 2012 After 2012
N= 13840 N=7477 N=6363
A. Dependent variables
Average Prices (Euros) 159774.8 (124793.6) 166764.7 (130183.4) 151561.3 (117626.8)
B Property characteristics
B.1 House characteristics
typ house .30 (.45) .32 (.46) .28 (.44)
pool .02 (.16) .03 (.17) .02 (.15)
terrace .10 (.31) .09 (.29) .11 (.32)
attic .15 (.36) .15 (.36) .15 (.36)
balcony .12 (.33) .10 (.30) .15 (.35)
parking surface .55 (3.82) .20 (2.03) .97 (5.17)
main room surface 89.01 (55.30) 94.39 (57.42) 82.67 (52.01)
less5years .11 (.31) .08 (.28) .13 (.34)
room nb 3.90 (1.92) 4.10 (1.83) 3.67 (2.01)
B.1 Flat characteristics
typ flat .76 (.42) .80 (.39) .71 (.44)
level nb 2.39 (1.81) 2.51 (1.94) 2.30 (1.70)
attic .15 (.36) .15 (.36) .15 (.36)
balcony .12 (.33) .10 (.30) .15 (.35)
parking surface .55 (3.82) .20 (2.03) .97 (5.17)
main room surface 89.01 (55.30) 94.39 57.42) 82.67 (52.01)
less5years .11 (.31) .08 (.28) .13 (.34)
room nb 3.91 (1.92) 4.1 (1.83) 3.67 (2.01)
Note: Reported values are means with standard deviations in brackets. The number of observations is
13840. The time period covered in the analysis is 2011-2014, and the unit of analysis is the transaction
-year. ’Treated’ is defined as municipalities in a sensitive area, and ’control’ are municipalities in non-
sensitive area in term of nitrates.
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Table 2: The impact of vulnerable zones revision on property prices with respect to treat-
ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES treatment 1 treatment 2 treatment 3
nitrates*policy -0.0250 -0.0168 -0.00851 -0.0163 -0.0318 -0.0151
(0.0211) (0.0153) (0.0227) (0.0217) (0.0235) (0.0163)
attic -0.0540*** -0.0142 -0.0461***
(0.0155) (0.0266) (0.0145)
balcony 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.0153) (0.0196) (0.0156)
parking surface 0.00625*** 0.00657*** 0.00579***
(0.00103) (0.00115) (0.00109)
main room surface 0.00348*** 0.00274** 0.00332***
(0.00111) (0.00136) (0.00118)
less5years 0.323*** 0.325*** 0.335***
(0.0217) (0.0237) (0.0248)
room nb 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.128***
(0.0227) (0.0277) (0.0239)
house 0.263*** 0.258*** 0.285***
(0.0231) (0.0328) (0.0239)
Municipalities FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,787 13,787 6,803 6,803 11,387 11,387
R-squared 0.266 0.655 0.229 0.622 0.279 0.677
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimates of the reduced form estimate of the effect of vulnerable
zone boundary on the log of property prices. The treatment group represents both properties that were
vulnerable before 2012 and properties that will become vulnerable in 2012. All regressions are estimated
using municipalities fixed effect, with standard errors clustered at the year and municipality level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: The impact of vulnerable zones revision on property prices for property classified
as vulnerable in 2012 and before 2012 (treatment 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Flat House
nitrates*policy -0.0758** -0.0513** -0.0704*** -0.0424***
(0.0367) (0.0209) (0.0221) (0.0162)
Property characteristics No Yes No Yes
Municipalities FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,777 4,777 9,010 9,010
R-squared 0.375 0.669 0.392 0.671
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimates of the reduced form estimate of the effect of vulnerable
zone revision on the log of property prices. The treatment group represents both properties that were
vulnerable before 2012 and properties that will become vulnerable in 2012. All regressions are estimated
using municipalities fixed effect, with standard errors clustered at the year and municipality level. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: The impact of vulnerable zones revision on property prices for property classified
as vulnerable in 2012 (treatment 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Flat House
nitrates*policy -0.115** -0.0612* -0.0533* -0.0333
(0.0445) (0.0352) (0.0288) (0.0215)
Property characteristics No Yes No Yes
Municipalities FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,122 3,122 3,681 3,681
R-squared 0.229 0.548 0.386 0.671
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimates of the reduced form estimate of the effect of the revision
on the log of property prices. The treatment group represents only properties that will become vulnerable
in 2012. All regressions are estimated using municipalities fixed effect, with standard errors clustered at
the year and municipality level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted
by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: The impact of vulnerable zones revision on property prices for property classified
as vulnerable before 2012 (treatment 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Flat House
nitrates*policy -0.0532 -0.0403** -0.0755*** -0.0431**
(0.0402) (0.0182) (0.0236) (0.0170)
Property characteristics No Yes No Yes
Municipalities FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,907 3,907 7,480 7,480
R-squared 0.407 0.721 0.404 0.675
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimates of the reduced form estimate of the effect of the revision
on the log of property prices. The treatment group represents only properties that were vulnerable before
2012. All regressions are estimated using municipalities fixed effect, with standard errors clustered at the
year and municipality level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted by:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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